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VALUATION TRIBUNAL FOR ENGLAND

Council Tax Liability; section 4(1) & (2) Local Government Finance Act and article 3 of the
Council Tax (Exempt Dwellings) Order 1992 SI 558 as amended by the Council Tax (Exempt
Dwellings) (Amendment) (England) Order 2012 SI 2965; whether purpose-built student flats
separately entered on the list comprised a hall of residence within Class M of the Order; appeal
Dismissed.
RE:

UPP-D47 Block D 2A Upperton Road LE3 0AD
265, The Summit, LE2 7BF
EB31, 70 Eastern Boulevard, LE2 7HT

APPEAL NO: 2465M197400/037C
APPEAL NO: 2465M196502/037C
APPEAL NO: 2465M197018/037C

BETWEEN:

STUDENT UNION LETTINGS LTD

Appellant

AND
LEICESTER CITY COUNCIL

PANEL:

Respondent

Mr M Young (Vice President)
Mrs N Carr

SITTING AT:
NSPCC National Training Centre, 3 Gilmour Close, Beaumont Leys, Leicester LE4 1EZ
ON:

Wednesday, 6 September 2017

APPEARANCES:
Mr Alan Murdie, Counsel, for the Appellant
Ms J Wigley, of Counsel, for the Respondent.
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Summary of Decision
1. The appeals are dismissed. The appeal dwellings do not qualify for a class M exemption
from council tax within the meaning of section 4(1) and (2) of the Local Government
Finance Act 1992 and the Council Tax (Exempt Dwellings) Order 1992 SI 558 article 3
as amended by the Council Tax (Exempt Dwellings) (Amendment) (England) Order 2012
SI 2965.
Introduction
2. The Appellant brought these appeals under section 16 of the Local Government Finance
Act 1992 (‘the Act’) against a decision of the Respondent that, for the purposes of section
4(1) & (2) of the Act and article 3 of the Council Tax (Exempt Dwellings) Order 1992 SI
558 as amended by the Council Tax (Exempt Dwellings) (Amendment) (England) Order
2012 SI 2965, the student dwellings known as UPP-D47 Block D 2A Upperton Road
LE3 0AD, 265, The Summit, LE2 7BF, and EB31, 70 Eastern Boulevard, LE2 7HT
(collectively hereafter ‘the appeal Accommodation’) did not fulfil the requirements of the
Class M exemption from council tax liability.
3. On 27 February 2017 it was directed that these three appeals should be heard as lead
appeals, the decision in which would determine the question for all other appeals made
by the appellants on the same grounds. Directions for provision of evidence were given.
By the date of the hearing, neither party was able to provide the date ranges to which
these appeals related, and it was agreed that relevant dates would be provided after the
Panel’s decision as necessary.
Legislation
4. Council tax is payable in respect of any chargeable dwelling within a Billing Authority’s
area that is not an exempt dwelling: section 4 (1) & (2) of the Act.
5. Section 4(3) of the Act provides for the Secretary of State to prescribe factors for classes
of dwellings to be exempt. By the Council Tax (Exempt Dwellings) Order 1992, as
amended by the Council Tax (Exempt Dwellings) (Amendment) (England) Order 2012,
the Secretary of State prescribed for certain classes of dwellings to be exempt.
6. Class M is one such exemption: “a dwelling comprising a hall of residence provided
predominantly for the accommodation of students which is either:
(a) owned or managed by an institution within the meaning of paragraph 5 of Schedule 1
to the Act or by a body established for charitable purposes only; or
(b) the subject of an agreement allowing such an institution to nominate the majority of
the persons who are to occupy the accommodation so provided”.
7. A further exemption, also relating to students, is class N:
(1) a dwelling which is either –
(a) occupied by one or more residents all of whom are relevant persons; or
(b) occupied only by one or more relevant persons as term-time accommodation;
(2) for the purposes of paragraph (1) –
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(a) “relevant person” means –
(i)

a student;

(ii)

a student’s spouse, civil partner or dependant… [subject to various
conditions, none of which are relevant to the present appeals]; or

(iii)

[a person to whom Class C applies, also not relevant to the present
appeals);

(b) a dwelling is to be regarded as occupied by a relevant person as term time
accommodation during any vacation in which he –
(i)

holds a freehold or leasehold interest in or licence to occupy the whole or
any part of the dwelling; and

(ii)

has previously used or intends to use the dwelling as term time
accommodation.

Decision and Reasons
8. The Registrar has authorised that, in a variation from usual practice under the tribunal’s
Practice Statement VTE/PS/C5 Statement of Reasons in Council Tax Liability Appeals,
which requires only summary reasons to be issued with the decision notice, the following
full written statement of reasons will be issued.
The Appellant’s case
9. The Appellant was incorporated as a not-for-profit limited company on 9 July 2012 for
the purpose of management of various University accommodation throughout Leicester
and is a registered charity. The appeal Accommodation was being so managed. Mr Irving
Hill, CEO of the Appellant, gave evidence regarding the appeal Accommodation,
including a digitally pre-recorded tour of two of the units of the appeal Accommodation,
other representative accommodation and the surrounding area. He described the
respective units as ‘typical’ of all of the units subject to appeal. In essence, the
accommodation in the various blocks comprised either self-contained flats for individual
accommodation, or alternatively ‘cluster flats’; self-contained units in which were situate
a number of separate bedrooms with en-suite bathrooms, which were each served by a
communal kitchen and lounge area. Plans relating to the appeal Accommodation were
provided. The Appellant also managed university accommodation purpose-built by De
Montfort University and sold to the current owners, G. L. Europe, in which separate
rooms were let in blocks with shared communal facilities.
10. It was the Appellant’s case that the only real difference between the appeal
Accommodation and the cluster flats or other typical university accommodation was that
the latter were occupied by multiple people with shared kitchen and living space, whereas
the appeal Accommodation was entirely self-contained for an individual student (or, as
the case may be, a married or otherwise intimately associated couple). Each unit had its
own kitchenette and bathroom. Nevertheless, those individual students had access to
shared facilities within the student blocks generally, including a gym, study area, and
supermarket and coffee shops within the same area of the development, albeit that they
were not adjoined. The development area incorporating the appeal Accommodation was
substantially on a private road save for public highway access to the supermarket car
park. This was very much, in the Appellant’s view, a ‘campus’. The fixtures and fittings
and general appointment of the cluster flats and self-contained flats were to the same high
specification.
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11. The appeal Accommodation was let to students exclusively or to a student and their
partner but the lead person on the tenancy agreement would always be the student. The
Appellant described the tenancy as a 52 week letting, although the agreements provided
at the hearing were for a term of twelve months but with a period of 8 weeks in which the
student was not entitled to occupy the unit without prior consent of the landlord but paid
a “summer retainer” for those 8 weeks at half the usual rent in order to reserve, if so
wished, the appeal Accommodation for the following year. Therefore, the appeal
Accommodation was let for the entire year, from year to year. While this meant that for
the whole of the year the student occupying the accommodation was entitled to class N
exemption the Appellant asserted the appeal Accommodation also fulfilled the
requirements of class M.
12. It was pointed out for the Appellant that the Respondent’s classification of the appeal
Accommodation as class N only was causing the Appellant an ‘administrative nightmare’
for the following reasons. Inevitably, albeit that students signed up for the appeal
Accommodation at the beginning of the academic year, there was some ‘churn’ – some
would leave early because they had failed their course, some would move to alternative
accommodation, others were on shorter courses and each winter there was around a 10%
drop-out rate. Because each of these events rendered class N no longer applicable and
each occurred on a different day, it was almost impossible to know when the Appellant
became liable and for which periods. Sometimes they did not even know that the
occupant had left until some time afterwards. The administration was more than a notfor-profit charity, fulfilling the description set out in Class M, should be required to
handle. The Appellant accepted that the majority of student lets ran smoothly year to
year, but those that fell within the exceptions described had resulted in all sort of
problems including service of demands on the flats themselves rather than the Appellant
and failure to notify the Appellant or G.L . Europe of enforcement proceedings.
13. The Appellant accepted that each of the flats forming the appeal Accommodation was a
separate entry in the council tax valuation list, each at valuation band A. The cluster flats
were a each single entry representing a single unit with several bedrooms. An example of
this was Flat 56, which was listed in band C. Ultimately, in the view of Appellant there
was no difference – the building containing the appeal Accommodation was a university
hall of residence and should be treated as such for the class M exemption.
14. Mr Murdie argued that although each separate flat was to be considered a hereditament
for the purposes of section 3 of the Act, and therefore each flat was a dwelling, that did
not automatically mean that, absent aggregation, the appeal was bound to fail. It was the
Panel’s job to look at the legislation as a whole. In his submission each of the dwellings
fell to be considered as a hall of residence, as the intention of Parliament was that
students would be exempt from council tax. The Interpretation Act 1978 provided at
section 6 that unless the contrary intention appears the singular includes the plural, so
there was no requirement for occupation by ‘students’; a single student occupying the
dwelling could be sufficient (see Annicola Investments Ltd & Anor v Minister of Housing
and Local Government [1968] 1 QB 631 per Lawrence J at 642). Moreover, ‘a dwelling
comprising a hall of residence’ in natural language could be read as a dwelling forming
part of such a hall. The exemption did not make any mention of a requirement for any
form of communal living.
15. In Mr Murdie’s submission it was the intention of Parliament as expressed in class M,
that student accommodation should not be the subject of council tax, and it was
imperative that the Panel considered the nexus or causal link between the right of the
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student to occupy and the nature of that occupation, when determining whether some
other class of exemption might be applicable. There was no lawful form of occupation of
the appeal Accommodation other than through the Appellant, and the Appellant fell
squarely within the requirements of Class M(a). Given the nature of the occupation, this
was a clear and plain case to which class M applied. It was only if the preconditions (a)
or (b) were missing that students would then fall into class N, in which was absent any
connection with the educational institution.
16. Mr Murdie relied on what he described as a common-sense approach to the words
‘dwelling comprising a hall of residence’. He submitted that there was no technical
definition of ‘hall of residence’, and the types of accommodation that could fulfil this
requirement were wide and various. Since the appeal Accommodation (the flats) fulfilled
the qualifying relationship with the Educational Institution via the Appellant, each flat
could be a hall of residence by relationship with all the other flats. The appeal
Accommodation was not just ‘predominantly for’ but rather exclusively for the
occupation by students of the relevant institutions, albeit it could be used for conferences
and so forth outside of term-time. He reminded the Panel that it should not take too
narrow an approach to interpretation or put too great an emphasis on single words
(Harrow Borough of London v Ayiku [2012] All ER (D) 105).
The Respondent’s case
17. The Respondent relied on the witness statement of Steven King and the separate entry in
the valuation list for the appeal Accommodation flats as the correct basis for the demands
made.

18. Ms Wigley submitted that, in order for a dwelling to fall within the class M exemption, it
had to satisfy one preliminary point and then three conditions: the preliminary point was
that it had to be entered on the valuation list; thereafter the three conditions were that (1)
the dwelling must comprise a hall of residence; (2) it must be provided predominantly for
the accommodation of students, and; (3) paragraphs M(a) or (b) must be satisfied.
19. Ms Wigley conceded that condition (3) was satisfied and there was no dispute. She also
conceded that condition (2) was satisfied as the appeal Accommodation was plainly
predominantly for the accommodation of students, whether that be spatially or
temporally.
20. However condition (1) required the appeal Accommodation to be a hall of residence.
What the Appellant sought to do was render those words irrelevant. This was not an
approach that was open to the Panel: Attorney General’s Reference (no 1 of 1975) [1975]
1 QB 773 at 779 E-F).
21. In Ms Wigley’s submission, the term ‘hall of residence’ was not defined. Class M had
remained un-amended since introduced by Parliament in 1992. She did not have any
evidence of what a hall of residence was in 1992, or indeed whether accommodation of
the type subject to the appeals existed at that time. She also acknowledged that there had
been a progression of changes in student accommodation since that date, so that the
traditional understanding of what comprised a hall of residence might now have changed.
However, the condition that the accommodation had to ‘comprise a hall of residence’ still
had to be met (Stowe School Ltd v Aylesbury Vale District Council 0405M64150/165C 2
February 2012).
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22. Administrative convenience, policy considerations and so forth were, in Ms Wigley’s
submission, marginal considerations. Where the words were clear, it was not for the
Tribunal to reinterpret the law, but rather it was the Panel’s role to give effect to them.
23. Ms Wigley argued that despite the fact that the term had not been defined, ‘hall of
residence’ connoted a particular type of specialised residential accommodation, for the
accommodation of more than a single student. Within its ordinary meaning, there was a
requirement for a significant degree of communal living and sharing of facilities. Thus, a
self-contained flat could not satisfy the requirement.
24. Ms Wigley relied on a number of definitions from other legislative regimes, in which the
term hall of residence meant something more than just accommodation for a student
(Schedule 3 paragraph 11 Immigration Act 2014; section 59(3)(b) and 59(4)(b) Land and
Building Transaction Tax (Scotland) Act 2013; Article 6 Redress Schemes for Lettings
Agency Work and Property Management Work (Requirement to Belong to a Scheme etc)
(England) Order 2014/2359; Schedule 29A paragraph 8 Finance Act 2004). From these
she asserted that the common thread was that a hall of residence was different from a
dwelling that was merely occupied by a student or merely institutionally managed student
accommodation.
25. In the present appeals, the term must add something more, otherwise it would not be
added to the other requirements. The Appellant’s contention that simply fulfilling M(a) or
(b) was enough to fulfil this separate condition was unsustainable. In Ms Wigley’s
submission, the difference was the element of communal living. That is the reason that
the Respondent had conceded that the cluster flats represented halls of residence – they
had shared kitchen and living facilities. The cluster flats were also each a single entry in
the valuation list.
26. The appeal Accommodation was each a separate flat, with a separate entrance, and a
separate entry on the valuation list as a separate hereditament. Each separate dwelling –
each flat - therefore could not meet the definition of a hall of residence. Each had its own
essential day-to-day living facilities. The communal facilities were not contingent upon
accommodation within the appeal Accommodation – they were open to all students in all
of the accommodation provided. They were not connected to the appeal Accommodation.
They did not form any property rights in the tenancy agreements for the appeal
Accommodation.
27. The appeal Accommodation fell outside of the class M definition for that reason. That did
not deprive the Appellant of the benefit of an exemption from council tax for the
Accommodation. It merely meant that that exemption fell within class N. The very
existence of class N supported the proposition that condition (1) in class M - that the
dwelling comprised a hall of residence - must mean something more than simply
satisfying condition (3).
28. In so far as administrative inconvenience was concerned, it was Ms Wigley’s submission
that this was simply irrelevant to the interpretation of statute (Stowe School), and that it
had been overplayed by the Appellant – it was entirely within its gift to make it simple
for itself. It had merely complicated things by the use of tenancy agreements that granted
a right of occupation for less than 52 weeks. The tenancy itself could not be described as
a 52 week tenancy. The Appellant should simplify things for itself. This was not within
the purview of the Respondent. The Appellant’s own particular policies were causing the
‘administrative nightmare’, not the legislation. Moreover, the Appellant was
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commercially benefitting from its own policies. Individual flats were more attractive to
let out for conferences and short stays. The Appellant made revenue as a consequence.
The Appellant could not have it both ways.
Decision
29. The sole issue in these appeals is the interpretation of the class M exemption in Council
Tax (Exempt Dwellings) Order 1992 as amended (set out above).
30. The Panel agrees with Ms Wigley’s submission that the exemption cannot be read as if
the words ‘a dwelling comprising a hall of residence’ do not exist, and rejects Mr
Murdie’s contention that fulfilment of M(a) or (b), i.e. control or management of the
accommodation, is sufficient in itself to satisfy the exemption in circumstances where the
accommodation is provided predominantly for student accommodation.
31. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the class N exemption provides a further
avenue for student exemption from council tax. It is clear, in the Panel’s view, that
Parliament anticipated more than one way in which a student would be exempt from
council tax. Had Parliament intended that any student accommodation would qualify for
exemption under class M if it was owned or managed as anticipated in M(a) or (b), the
words ‘a dwelling comprising a hall of residence’ would not appear in the provision at
all; they would be otiose. The words must therefore be given effect as one of the
conditions to be fulfilled for the exemption to apply (Attorney General’s Reference (No.
1 of 1975) [1975] 1 QB 773). To read the provision in any other way would be unnatural.
32. Mr Murdie conceded that in applying the section each of the appeal Accommodation
units, i.e. each of the flats, fell to be considered as the ‘dwelling’ for the purposes of the
exemption. In the alternative to his first submission above, his position was that each of
the flats, being a disaggregated hereditament entered on the list, was a dwelling, and each
satisfied individually the requirement of a hall of residence. In the Panel’s view this was
a properly made concession. Unless and until a successful application for aggregation is
made, the valuation list is determinative of the dwellings being separate hereditaments
and therefore separate dwellings (section 3 of the Act, s115(1) General Rate Act 1967
and Woolway (Valuation Officer) v Mazars LLP [2015] AC 1862).
33. Further, Ms Wigley having made proper concessions that the Appellant satisfies M(a)
and that the accommodation is predominantly for the accommodation of students, the
question is narrowed further: we need only determine whether, for the purposes of class
M, the appeal Accommodation can be described as a ‘a dwelling comprising a hall of
residence’. If that condition is satisfied, then the appeals succeed. If it is not, then the
appeals must fail. In either case, there are consequences for the other appeals.
34. Neither party was able to define what is meant by a ‘hall of residence’. This is not
surprising; there is no definition in the Order. It may be that the draftsman thought the
concept so obvious that it needed no definition. It may well have been obvious in 1992.
There was no evidence of a notional hall of residence in 1992, nor whether flats of the
type represented by the appeal Accommodation existed at that date. It is without question
that student accommodation has changed significantly since that date.
35. The Appellant argues that a single unit of accommodation, for the occupation of a single
student, as in each of the appeals can satisfy the definition of a hall of residence. In his
submission, the co-location of the appeal Accommodation with facilities shared with
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other students in a ‘campus’ style set up is enough to satisfy the requirement. There is no
need for shared or communal ‘living’, but rather the Panel should direct itself to the
broader use of the site. The exemption itself makes no provision for shared or communal
facilities, and Parliament intends that student accommodation should not be the subject of
tax. He effectively also argues that the use of the word ‘comprising’ can be interpreted as
‘Comprised within’.
36. With respect to Mr Murdie, the two positions he advanced for the Appellant are
irreconcilable. Either the single dwelling comprises the hall of residence, which is the
crux of the Appellant’s case, or each single flat is comprised within a hall of residence.
For this circumstance to apply, the hall of residence must be the dwelling. Coming back
to the point of aggregation on the council tax list, and the number of hereditaments there
recorded, in the Panel’s view in its current form the entries on the list cannot support the
latter interpretation. ‘Comprising’, by its natural meaning, means consisting of, or made
up of. Thus, the dwelling must consist of the hall of residence, not simply be included
within some theoretical it. We prefer his original concession; each of the flats
representing the appeal Accommodation must itself be a hall of residence to satisfy the
exemption.
37. The Respondent argues that a self-contained unit of accommodation for the occupation of
a single student (or, as the case may be, an intimate couple) is simply incapable of
fulfilling the concept of a hall of residence. There must be some element of communal
living for a dwelling, in the traditional sense, and in the sense anticipated by the
exemption, to qualify as a hall of residence.
38. The Panel has directed itself to the dictionary definition of a hall of residence, as
anticipated in Stowe School. The Complete Oxford English Dictionary does not contain a
definition of a ‘hall of residence’ as a separate definition, but in its definition of hall it
states as follows:
“A term applied, especially in the English universities, to a building or
buildings set apart for the residence or instruction of students, and, by
transference, to the body of students occupying it... [After an explanation of the
historical evolution of the word] c. In recent times, applied to buildings in
University towns, established, whether by the University or not, for the use of
students in the higher learning, sometimes enjoying the privileges of the
University and sometimes not: eg. at Oxford, private halls for the residence of
undergraduate members of the University, under the charge of a member of
Convocation; theological halls (eg. Wycliffe Hall); halls for women students
(eg Somerville Hall)."
39. The shorter OED makes no mention of ‘hall of residence’ as a separate definition, but
states that a hall can be "A building, administered by a university, polytechnic, etc., in
which students live (also hall of residence); an establishment of higher education in
certain university towns, sometimes with (usually restricted) affiliation to the university.”
40. Shorter still, the Cambridge dictionary defines a hall of residence as ‘a college building
where students live.’
41. These definitions, it may be said, are somewhat unedifying. On the one hand, they make
no mention of shared facilities. On the other, each of the definitions anticipates that there
is a building comprising the hall, in which is accommodated (whether for residential or
educational purposes) a body of students.
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42. None of the definitions, perforce, takes into account the considerations that we must take
in to account regarding the meaning of ‘dwelling’ or ‘hereditament’ by virtue of section 3
of the Act, s115(1) General Rate Act 1967 and Woolway v Mazars.
43. In our view, the balance in the present appeals falls on the side of the Respondent. By its
ordinary and natural meaning the phrase ‘a dwelling comprising a hall of residence’
implies something greater than a single self-contained flat, which is the reason the use of
the word ‘students’ does not lend itself to interpretation in the singular per the provisions
of section 6 of the Interpretation Act 1978 and Annicola, as Mr Murdie contended. The
use of the plural in this provision is, in our view, no mistake but rather a deliberate choice
by Parliament, which must be given effect as such. Neither can ‘comprising’ be
interpreted in the way for which the Appellant argues, and since each of the flats in this
case is a separate hereditament, and therefore a separate dwelling, it could not help the
Appellant in any event. We are content that in so finding, we have not too narrow an
approach as was criticised in Ayiku. We are confined to interpret the dwelling in this case
as each separate, self-contained flat, and in our view a separate flat for the
accommodation of a single student (or, as may be, a couple sharing an intimate
relationship) has no feature of a hall of residence. By natural extension, were this to be
stretched to its limits, it would allow any university to enter into a nomination agreement
as anticipated in M(b) with any private individual in respect of property in the private
sector, and call it a hall of residence for the purposes of the class M exemption,
regardless of any educational or indeed basic co-location or other connection to the
institution. This, in our view, cannot have been Parliament’s intention. It seems to us that
this is the very reason for the class N exemption to exist. Whilst we have a great deal of
sympathy with the difficulties that the Appellant faces in administering the scheme that
they have chosen, this cannot change the meaning of the Order.
44. Were the ‘dwelling’ in question the building, however, we would take the opposite view.
Were the units aggregated, the appeal Accommodation would be contained within a
single hereditament (the dwelling), which dwelling would comprise a hall of residence.
Were that the case, it would be our view that the lack of communal or shared living
would be immaterial; the building in that case would fall squarely within the definition.
Common areas for the use of all students would be sufficient to cast the accommodation
in the light of the class M exemption, and the site itself bears the features of campus
living. This acknowledges the reality of improvements made to student accommodation,
and indeed the changes in students’ expectations, since the exemption was drafted.
45. It is therefore the Panel’s decision that the appeals must be dismissed with the consequent
dismissal of the appeals they lead.

M.F. Young
N. Carr
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